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I.

OVERVIEW

Mankind is on the brink of a historic event which has no equal in human
history: the continuous manned occupation of outer space. Never before have
humans permanently occupied an alien environment; yet current events indicate that this epoch will begin within a decade.
During the 1960's space habitation was characterized by, at most, twoweek stays by professional American or Soviet astronaut crews. In the early
1970's, the American Skylab program extended manned occupation of space to
three month visits, separated by periods of nonhabitation. By 1981, the Soviets
had demonstrated, in their Salyut program, an ability to inhabit space on a
continuous basis for over six months.' And, in October 1982, simultaneous
manned presence in space included four astronauts in the Space Shuttle and
two cosmonauts in a second long-duration Salyut mission.
There is a clear trend toward permanent habitation of the outer space environment. Space agencies in the United States, the U.S.S.R., Western Europe
and Japan are currently designing permanently habitable space stations for the
late 1980's-early 1990's time frame.2 These space station plans are given
credence by NASA's budgeted Space Shuttle fleet of five orbiters (each of
which can carry a payload bulk equivalent to four Volkswagen vans), the Soviet Union's Proton-derivative launcher (capable of orbiting a space station in
a single launch), and by the European Space Agency's Spacelab, which provides a comfortable shirt-sleeve environment in which a space station crew can
Partner, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis; Washington, D.C.
Associate, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis; Washington, D.C.

*
**

*

Associate, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis; Washington, D.C.

Lenorovitz, Soviets Study Long Duration Missions, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
Sept. 28, 1981 at 41.
2 Covault, NASA Mulls InternationalEffort on Space Stations, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Mar. 1, 1982 at 20 [hereinafter cited as InternationalSpace Stations]; Manned Orbital
Space Station Studied, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Aug. 23, 1982 at 57.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

work and live.3 The long range but necessarily logical result of these concepts
has been identified by Princeton physics Professor Gerard K. O'Neill as numerous freeflying space stations or space colonies, each populated by
thousands of persons. A NASA-funded study4 of O'Neill's ideas has shown them
to be feasible within the next twenty years.
The legal consequences of a permanent manned presence in space are momentous - as significant as the legal consequences of permanent occupation of
one nation by another. It is to the nature of these legal consequences that this
Article is addressed.
Legal aspects of the coming epoch of permanent space occupation can best
be illustrated in the context of specific space development activities. Two such
activities which are providing major impetus to permanent space habitation
are (1) space manufacturing, including the deployment of large space structures, and (2) utilization of space for national defense missions. Legal aspects
and consequences of each of these activities are analyzed below.
II.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SPACE MANUFACTURING, INCLUDING DEPLOYMENT

OF LARGE SCALE STRUCTURES

A.

Relevant Physical Characteristicsof Outer Space

Microgravity is the physical characteristic of outer space upon which future space manufacturing will depend. Efforts to create or simulate this physical condition at or near the surface of the earth are only partially effective.
However, this condition has great utility for certain manufacturing processes.
Indeed, it is already generally acknowledged that the microgravity of space allows for the manufacture of certain products at quality levels, quantities and
prices which earth-based facilities can never duplicate5
Electrophoresis ably exemplifies the value of microgravity to an important
manufacturing process. This process separates certain valuable biological
materials from their host medium by passing the materials through an electric
potential. Cells of different types assume different charges and can thereby be
separated. When electrophoresis is attempted on earth, gravity convection
forces tend to overpower all movements with the result that only minute
amounts of pharmaceutically useful materials are obtained.6 In space the gravity convection forces are overcome and large quantities of critically important
pharmaceuticals may be produced. Among these medicines are beta cells, interferon, epidermal growth factor products, growth hormone products, anti3

InternationalSpace Stations, supra note 2, at 20.

' NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION[hereinafter
SOURCES AND SPACE SETTLEMENTS,

cited as NASA],

SPACE RE-

Washington, D.C., 1979.

5 D. SMITH, SPACE STATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 31-62 (1979); G. O'NEILL, THE
HIGH FRONTIER 98-143 (1978); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CIVILIAN SPACE POLICY AND APPLICATIONS, June, 1982 at 334-40.
' Covault, Payload Tied to Commercial Drug Goal, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, May
31, 1982, at 51.
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tryspin products and antihemophilic products.7 The process has been successfully tested on Space Shuttle Mission 4, and two American firms developing
the process are seeking to base the orbiting processing facility on a space station or space facility." It is anticipated that hundreds of thousands of persons
will benefit from these space medicines by 1990.
The booming electronics industry can also benefit enormously from the
microgravity of space. The growth of large single pure crystals, an impossibility
in earth gravity, has been readily demonstrated in space.9 Such crystals imply
dramatic reductions in size, and commensurate increases in speed, of electronic
information processing hardware.
Enormous spatial volume, coupled with microgravity and near continuous
exposure to sunlight, is a further physical characteristic of space with great
potential benefit. This characteristic takes on an economic value through the
creation of very large structures in space, up to ten kilometers in length, which
may be used for the collection and transmission of solar energy to earth.10 The
efficiency of space-based photovoltaic collectors exceeds significantly the efficiency attainable on earth."' These same physical characteristics of space may
be used to support national defense and scientific missions utilizing large-scale
manufacturing of metal alloys
with strength-to-mass ratios far exceeding those
12
of terrestrial manufacture.
B.

Legal Implications

As space manufacturing and deployment of large space structures proceed,
there is a corresponding increase in the potential for conffict between the activities of various states. First, as space hardware proliferates in number and size,
there is an ever growing possibility of physical collision 3 and consequent dispute over liability for resulting damage. And, secondly, as large space structures evolve to support national defense and sensitive manufacturing or scientific missions, there is a growing likelihood that states will seek to establish
sovereign zones about such structures. Recognition of national sovereignty in
space is a further source of dispute.
1.

Space Liability
Since 1973 the world has had in place a detailed legal process for deter-

7

Id.

8 These firms are McDonnell Douglas Astronautics and Ortho Pharmaceuticals Division of
Johnson & Johnson. See Prototype Plan Follows Space Processing Test, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECHNOLOGY, July 19, 1982, at 26-7.

9 G.

56; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at 335.
The Earth Benefits of Solar Power Satellites, 1 SPACE SOLAR POWER REV. 9-37

O'NEILL, supra note 5, at

10 Glaser,

(1980).
11Kraft & Piland, The Solar Power Satellite Concept Decade, 1 SPACE SOLAR POWER REV. 39-63 (1980).
12 ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS, Oct. 1982, at 44-52.

The Past Decade and the Next

13 Presently estimated at 10% collision probability, over ten years, in the geostationary orbit.
AMER. ASTRONAUTICAL SOCIETY, SPACE SAFETY 130 (1978).
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mining liability for damage caused by space objects. This process is spelled out
in the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects ("Liability Convention"). 1 4 For damage to objects in space, the Liability
Convention bases liability on fault.1" That is, a party state is liable for compensation to an entity damaged in space by its space activities only to the extent
that the party state is negligent. Iffault is shared, liability for damage is
shared in proportion to fault. 6
The liable party is called the "launching state," defined as a state which
launches, procures the launch or from whose territory is launched, the damagecausing space object.17 This definition of liable party creates a potential for
legal dispute in cases where more than one country participates in the launching of a space object. While each nation participating in a multinational space
venture has joint and several liability,18 these nations may not have a common
view as to fault. This potential for dispute is aggravated by the fact that an
injured party may demand all its compensation from any liable state. 9
Such disputes among "launching states" are best resolved in advance
through contract and insurance. Indeed, NASA currently requires third-party
20
liability insurance as a condition to providing space transportation services.
The tort covered by the Liability Convention is "damage," defined as "loss
of life, personal injury or other impairment of health or loss or damage to
property of states or of persons, natural or juridicial, or property of international intergovernmental organizations."21 So broad a definition of damage is
certain to be a source of dispute between parties to a space accident. The definition, for example, leaves open the possibility of liability for both direct and
indirect damage. While damage to a space-based electrophoresis manufacturing facility is clearly compensable, it is unclear whether the lost profits of the
facility's operators, or the impaired health of persons dependent on the facility's medicines, are also subject to compensation.
The Liability Convention provides a two-step legal procedure for resolving
disputes over issues such as existence and degree of fault and extent of compensable damage. Only states may present claims for damage suffered due to
space activities,2 2 and such claims must first be submitted through diplomatic
channels to a launching state within one year following either the damage or
the identification of the liable launching state.2 3 If diplomatic relations are not
14 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for
signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, [hereinafter cited as Liability
Convention].
15Id., art. II1at 2392.

16Id., art. IV at 2393.
17Id.,

art. I at 2392.
Is Id., art. V at 2394.
19 Id.

20 See Dula, Management of Interpartyand Third-PartyLiabilityfor Routine Space Shuttle
Operations,26 Damm L. Rlv. INS. ANN.741 (1977).
2 Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. I at 2392.
22 Id., art. VIII at 2395.
- Id., art. X at 2396.
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maintained with the launching state, the claim may be submitted to that state
through a third state which does maintain diplomatic relations, or through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. 2 The launching state is allowed one
year from the date of claim submission in which to settle the claim through
diplomatic negotiation. In the only instance to date in which the Liability Convention was invoked, that of Canada's claim on the Soviet Union for compensation for radioactive debris clean-up activities caused by the fall from orbit of
Cosmos 954, diplomatic negotiations
successfully resulted in a payment to
25
Canada of over six million dollars.
The second step of the Liability Convention's claims procedure occurs
only if the claim for damage cannot be diplomatically settled within one year
after submission. This second step involves the establishment of a Claims
Commission of three members with the claimant and launching states each
selecting one member and jointly agreeing upon the third member. 2 Where
there are several claimant or launching states, there must be collective agreement by all claimant and launching state members regarding their respective
representatives. 27 If no agreement can be reached on the third Claims Commission member within four months, either party may ask the U.N. SecretaryGeneral to appoint the third member.28 In the event that a state fails to appoint a member at all, the United
Nations appointee would become a single29
member Claims Commission.
The Claims Commission must determine fault and fix compensation for
damage in accordance with "international law and principles of justice and equity. ' 30 The Claims Commission's decision is binding only if the parties to the
dispute so agree beforehand. 31 In the absence of such an agreement, the decision is recommendatory only, but must be considered in "good faith. 3 2 There
is no ceiling on the amount of damages for which the tortfeasor state can be
held liable. 3
The above-described legal process for liability problems arising from space
activity is certainly a major achievement of the international legal community.
It provides an agreed-upon procedure for resolving liability disputes over space
resource development activity up through the limit of a recommendatory
Claims Commission decision. Beyond this point, no international procedure exists for resolving liability conflicts, and no formal procedure is likely to prove
viable, given the present reticence of states to cede binding enforcement jurisdiction to international institutions.3 "
24 Id., art. IX at 2396.
25 See COMMUNIQUE OF THE CANADIAN DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AYFAiRs,
26 Liability Convention, supra note 14, art. XIV at 2398.
27 Id., art. XVII at 2399.

No. 8, Jan. 23, 1979.

:8 Id., art. XV at 2398.

9 Id., art. XVI at 2398.
:0 Id., art. XH at 2397. Decisions are by majority vote. See art. XVI at 2399.
'x Id., art. XIX at 2400.
2

d.

23

Id.

34

See generally, Vereshchetin, State Sovereignty and Use of Outer Space ForApplied Pur-
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Nevertheless, risks not covered by Liability Convention procedures may be
covered by insurance. The rates of such "no-fault" space liability insurance
will depend on the magnitude of the space activity, the risk of loss and the
record of compliance by space-faring states with Claims Commission decisions,
both binding and recommendatory."
While insurance is an excellent vehicle for minimizing space liability disputes, it cannot be assumed that either adequate capacity or institutional arrangements exist for the risks involved in large-scale space industrialization.
Indeed, there is at present significant uncertainty as to whether the insurance
market will be able to continue existing underwriting practices for spacecraft
risks.36 The basis for this concern is a substantial excess of losses paid or reserved over premiums earned. 37 It may very well become necessary for governments to step in and become an insurer of last resort.38 Such government insurance, however, should probably be limited to specific large-scale projects in
order to avoid undercutting the private insurance market. This was the approach taken by the United States in passing the Price-Anderson Act, which
provides for government indemnification in the case of nuclear energy accidents. 9 As space industrialization expands under the protection of complementary government and private insurance, risks should become more well
known and controlled and the premium base for space insurance should expand. Projects previously insured under national statutes may then be within
the capacity of the private insurance market and government protection can be
reserved for projects at the ever-expanding frontier of space industrialization.
2. National Jurisdiction and Control in Space
An additional and more complex source of legal dispute posed by space
manufacturing and large space structure deployment involves the extension of
national sovereignty into space. The starting point for an analysis of national
sovereignty in space must be article I of the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("Outer Space Treaty").40 This article
'states that "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means. '41 This provision would appear to proscribe
individual states 42from attempting to assert the right to exclusive use of any
volume of space.

poses, 15 SoviET LAW AND Gov'T 75 (Fall 1976).
3 See Margo, Some Aspects of Insuring Satellites, INS. L.J. (1980) at 555-67.
' SATELLITE WK., Nov. 1, 1982 at 5.
37 Id.

See e.g., Dembling, CatastrophicAccidents: Indemnification of ContractorsAgainst Third
Party Liability, 10 J. SPAcE L. 1 (1982).
:, 42 U.S.C. § 2012-21 (1976).

0 Opened for signature, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
41 Id., art. II at 2413.
42 See Lachs, Some Reflections on the State of the Law of Outer Space, 9 J. SPACE L. 3, 7-9
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However, the force of article II is somewhat modified by article VIII of the
Outer Space Treaty. This article provides that "[a] state party to the Treaty
on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain
jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while
in outer space or on a celestial body. ' 43 Ownership of objects launched into
outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of
their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a
celestial body. This article, by vesting "jurisdiction and control" 44 of space objects in a state, implies a right to dictate access and utilization rights to portions of space occupied by national space facilities. Article XII of the Outer
Space Treaty supports this point by providing that "[a]ll stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies
shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the treaty on a basis
of reciprocity."45 First, by omitting facilities in outer space but not on the
moon and other celestial bodies, article XII implies that states maintain exclusive control over access to their space facilities in orbit. Second, by conditioning access opportunities to lunar facilities on a "basis of reciprocity," there is a
further implication of significant national control over portions of celestial
bodies encompassed by national space facilities.
There is, therefore, an inherent dilemma in space law between the proscription of national appropriation of any volume of space and the admission
of national jurisdiction and control rights for volumes of space encompassed
within national space facilities. To date this dilemma has yet to cause practical
legal problems because the volumes of outer space encompassed by space objects - the Salyut space stations, Skylab, communication satellites - are exceedingly small and are occupied in only a transient manner. However, by the
late 1980's and in the 1990's, this picture of space occupation will change
dramatically.
The resource development activities of space manufacturing and deployment of large space structures imply a permanent and growing occupation of
space. Permanent space facilities are being actively considered in the United
States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Western Europe and Japan.46 These facilities include joint plans of Fairchild Industries and NASA for a long-term
multi-mission space platform on which to base space manufacturing and scientific research payloads, 47 and a recent proposal of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
for joint U.S.-Japanese development of long duration space stations based on
European Spacelab Modules. NASA has funded detailed studies of large space
habitats occupying over a million cubic meters of space, to be built from mil-

(1981) for an insightful examination of the legal status of outer space and the status of orbital
overflights under customary international law.
43 Outer

Space Treaty, supra note 40, art. VIII at 2416.

44 Id.
41
46

47

Id., art. XII at 2418.
InternationalSpace Stations, supra note 2.
Lowndes, Fairchild,NASA Agree on Leasecraft,AVIATiON WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Octo-

ber 18, 1982 at 14; see also Manned Orbited Space Station Studied, supra, note 2, at 57.
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lions of metric tons of lunar materials.48 Also, both the U.S. and the Soviet
Union are considering stationing large-scale strategic defense equipment in
space.49 All these activities portend a significant potential for conflict over
competing claims to overlapping regions of space.
There do not now exist any formal legal procedures to govern competing
claims to exercise jurisdiction and control over volumes of space dedicated to
space manufacturing and large space structure missions. For example, if the
plans of two states or groups of states to deploy very large solar power satellites were to conflict, the dispute would have to be settled in an ad hoc
manner.
A start on appropriate conflict resolution procedures for large-scale space
industrialization activity has, however, been made. Article IX of the Outer
Space Treaty provides that:
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the
corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the treaty.50
The same article further provides that:
[I]f a State Party to the treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate
international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or
experiment.5 1
Finally, any state "which has reason to believe" that another state's planned
space activity would "cause potentially harmful interference" with its peaceful
utilization of outer space, may "request consultation concerning the activity. ....

",52

Clearly, provisions such as these represent but the beginning of a legal
process for the epoch of permanent space habitation, and their practical implementation remains to be demonstrated. It may be questioned, for instance,
whether any party state will voluntarily initiate a consultation proceeding concerning its own planned activities. Disputes concerning competition between
states for volumes of space which are not resolved through diplomatic negotiation will be a certain source of international tension and discord.
Disputes such as these which are not resolved through negotiation may be
48 See generally, NASA,

supra note 4.
" See generally, Soviets Outspending U.S. on Space by $3-4 Billion, AVIATION WK. & SPAcE
TECHNOLOGY, July 19, 1982 at 28-29.
50 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 40, art. IX.
t' Id.
52

Id.
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resolved in one of two ways. First, the parties to a dispute may resort to the
principle of proportionality. Under this principle, a state may use coercion to
enforce its rights, with such coercion being limited in magnitude to the threat
to international peace and security to which it is responding. While such coercion need not be military in nature, and need not occur in space, it must be
observed that both the United States and the Soviet Union are actively developing space weaponry. While these systems, known as ASATs, presently rely
upon kinetic energy for destruction, more advanced laser and charged particle
beam weapons are under development for the 1990's.53
A second, and far more preferable conflict resolution procedure would be
to submit disputes over competing claims to areas of space to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ is empowered to provide decisions on such
disputes pursuant to articles 34, 35 and 36 of the Court's organic statute.5 4 The
ICJ is an optimum forum because no court enjoys greater prestige and respect
on international legal issues and the issues in question are wholly international, being grounded in both positive and customary space law.5 5 Furthermore, space development disputes are likely to exist for decades to come, and
their future resolution will be facilitated greatly by a single source of international judicial precedent. Finally, because large-scale ventures require substantial time for realization, the conflicts to which they give rise might lend themselves to long-term resolution planning, a process which could be consistent
with the ICJ's adjudicatory time frame.
III.

LEGAL IMPLICATION OF UTILIZATION OF SPACE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

MISSIONS
A. Capability of the Outer Space Environment to Serve National Defense
Missions
It is beyond question that space serves as a resource for military exploitation, as well as for use by commercial interests. The high-altitude character of
outer space, and the fact that it completely encircles the earth and provides
the opportunity for access to any point of the globe gives rise to a natural
military staging area for offensive or defensive purposes. National security provides one of the greatest sources of impetus to a permanent manned presence
in space. The defense establishment can best handle the financial burden of
manned space stations and can readily appreciate the contribution men make
to complex space systems. Indeed the earliest budgeted long-duration manned
space mission, Manned Orbiting Laboratory, was a U.S. Air Force project. Current planning in both the Soviet Union and the United States for permanent
space stations contemplate such stations being dedicated either partially or to-

53 See Smith, Vought Tests Small Antisatellite System, AvwATiON WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
November 9, 1981 at 24.
" I.C.J., Acts and Documents Concerning the Organization of the Court, No. 4, Statute of the
Court, arts. 34, 35, 36 (1978).

5" With regard to the Court's universality, see A. El-Erian, The InternationalCourt of Justice

and the Concept of Universality, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 197 (1981).
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tally to national defense missions."
The wide line-of-sight capability offered by the high altitudes of space
provides a highly beneficial means of surveillance. It has been estimated that
three out of four of the more than 1,000 satellites launched by the Soviet
Union in the twenty years following Sputnik were for military purposes, while
348 of the 699 satellites launched by the United States during this period similarly had military purposes.57
The evolution of satellite surveillance technology has yielded new, sophisticated verification procedures. This technology not only made possible the
finalization of the U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 58 but the technology was expressly recognized in and protected by the ABM Treaty as "national
technical means of verification." 59 Today, satellites relay approximately threequarters of all United States military communications, while the Soviet military has reportedly established a fully redundant satellite communications system of its own. Satellites enable military ground, sea and air commanders to fix
their positions accurately; they help guide missiles; they map terrain and
weather patterns; and track troop movements and build-ups.8 0
Because of the critical role which satellites have assumed, both commercially and militarily, the military interest in space has taken the next obvious
step with the development of an antisatellite capability. Starting in the late
1960's, the Soviets have pursued a long-term test program to develop antisatellite "killer" satellites, and it has been suggested that the Soviets now have the
capacity to hit satellites in geosynchronous orbit.61 Beginning in 1977, the
United States in response undertook development of its own antisatellite
(ASAT) weapon, which will take the form of a "miniature homing device"
launched either by rocket or by plane. 2 Then, in 1978, the White House undertook a satellite defense program. 3 The first Air Force ASAT "squadron"
will reportedly be operational in 1984.
The American government recognized the potential usefulness of space as
a military resource as early as the adoption of the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958.5 In declaring the United States committed to devoting
space activities to peaceful purposes under the administration of a civilian
agency, NASA, Congress made an exception in the Act for "activities peculiar
to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military
" J. CANAN, WAR IN SPACE 167 (1982); Reagan Policy Expected to Aid Space Station DefiniAvIATiON WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, April 12, 1982 at 25-26.

tion Work,

,7J. CANAN, supra note 56 at 18.
" Limitation on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as ABM Treaty].
89 Id., art. XII.
6 J.CANAN, supra note 56, at 18.
61Id. at 22.
6'2See PrioritiesSet for Antisatellite System, AVIATION WK.& SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 3,
1979, at 57.
'3 Presidential Decision Memorandum 37, May 13, 1978.
" J. CANAN, supra note 56, at 19-21, 177.
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2484 (1976).
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operations, or the defense of the United States," which it stated were reserved
to the Defense Department.66
Speculation suggests that potential military applications of the space shuttle has fueled continued funding for that NASA project in the face of otherwise
severe budget cuts for civilian agencies. A ranking Air Force general has publicly testified that "space may be viewed as an attractive arena for a show of
force," since conflict there would not violate national boundaries, would involve little loss of life and would be relatively inexpensive.6 7 Finally, it is notable that the United States Air Force recently established a Space Command to
coordinate space-related military missions," a clear indication that military exploitation of space is under active consideration.
One persistent, though far from dominant, school of thought on the military use of space is that mankind's political disputes might eventually be resolved by conflict in space without the widespread havoc on earth which terrestrial nuclear war would bring. Whether in space or on land, however, conflict
resolution by use of force, as opposed to show of force, must be recognized as a
failure of legal process. The discussion which follows seeks to define the bases
upon which the opportunity for noncombatant procedures to resolve disputes
in space can be maximized.
B. Legal Implications: The Existing Legal Regime
Existing international legal standards prohibit neither conflict in space nor
use of space to support terrestrial conflict.7" The 1967 Outer Space Treaty declares that the use and exploration of space shall be conducted "in accordance
with international law, including the United Nations Charter, in the interest of
maintaining international peace," and provides for a "consultation" process to
resolve perceived possibilities for "interference" in the use of space. 1 The specific restrictions on military activity in the space segment are discrete, but important. Party states to the Outer Space Treaty are forbidden from orbiting
around the earth nuclear weapons or "weapons of mass destruction," and they
are prohibited from establishing military bases or fortifications, and
from con7 2
ducting military maneuvers on the moon or other celestial bodies.
Thus, the Treaty does not purport to control the establishment of travelling or orbitting manned military spacecraft. Moreover, by incorporting by reference the terms of the U.N. Charter, the Outer Space Convention endorses
the applicability to the space segment of article 51 of the Charter, which recognizes each nation's right of self-defense.7 3 Also, since the Outer Space Treaty
:6 42 U.S.C. § 2451(b) (1976).
67 PrioritiesSet for Antisatellite System, supra note 62, at 57.
:1 Washington Post, June 22, 1982, at A2, Col. 5.
69

See, e.g., M.

GOLOVINE, CONFLICT IN SPACE

136 (1962).

H. ALMOND, Military Activities in Outer Space-the Emerging Law, Research Paper
presented at Meeting of Int'l Astronautical Fed. (1981).
71 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 40, arts. III, IX.
70

72
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Id., art. IV.
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provides only for avoidance of interference between the peaceful uses of outer
space by party states, the entire issue of space resource development for national defense missions is unresolved. States may certainly disagree as to which
space defense missions are "peaceful" in character, and states may deny other
states the right to jurisdiction and control over volumes of space dedicated to
"non-peaceful" purposes."4
Additional specific restrictions on the military use of space flow from other
international agreements. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibits testing in space of nuclear weapons. 7 5 The ABM Treaty protects the satellites of
the two signatory powers from "interference" by the other side, and prohibits
the introduction of ABM technology into space.76 The 1977 Convention on Environmental Modification Techniques prohibits hostile long-lasting environmental modification techniques being employed in outer space.7
Recent advances in space capability of the Soviet Union and the United
States, in addition to the continuing escalation of the arms race between the
two superpowers, have heightened concern regarding the adequacy of international legal standards governing military use of space. Such concern has rekindled a movement to promote international negotiations to prohibit the extension of the arms race to outer space.
This movement is gaining momentum in the United States, and already
has garnered support on Capital Hill. In this regard, various resolutions have
recently been introduced in the United States Senate and House of Representatives, calling for the President to resume talks with the Soviet Union for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement prohibiting the use of weapons in space.
While some resolutions have called for the ban of only specific types of weapons (Senate Resolution 43 focuses on the prohibition of antisatellite weapons
as a first step), 78 others call for a comprehensive ban on weapons of any kind in
79
space.
C.

Legal Implications:Potential Scenarios

The ability of law to control or discourage military conflict in space rests,
as will be shown below, on limited footings. In the following survey of potential
military conflicts in space, analysis of such existing shortcomings will be pro-

tions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, presented at l1th Annual Conf., Int'l Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, April 1982, at 8.
14 Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in the Interpretationand the Implementation of the Rules
of InternationalSpace Law, 19 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225-31 (1981).
71 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, entered into force Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S.
No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. See art. I(1)(a).
71 ABM Treaty, supra note 58, arts. V, XII.
7 Convention on the Prohibition of Military and Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniq, entered into force Oct. 5, 1978, A/RES/31/72. The United States ratified
the Convention in January, 1980.
71 S. Res. 43, 98th Congress, 1st Session, February 2, 1983. See also S. Res. 129, 97th Congress, 1st Session, May 6, 1981.
71 H. J. Res. 120, 98th Congress, 1st Session, February 2, 1983; H. J. Res. 87, 98th Congress,
1st Session, January 25, 1983.
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vided, and possible amendment to governing legal standards suggested toward
the end of effectuating meaningful noncombatant procedural responses. It is
important to observe in this connection that the existing legal regime does not
distinguish between manned and unmanned use of space.
1. Attack on Space Objects
A physical attack on a manned or unmanned space object, whether effected by terrestrial or space means, would clearly constitute an act of aggression justifying the attacked country to respond in kind, or to seek alternative
political, economic, diplomatic and legal recourses." This result follows from
the preservation of "jurisdiction and control" by the state on whose registry
the space object is listed under article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, and on
the presumed reservation of the right of self-defense under article III of that
Treaty, as discussed above. As stated by Professor Almond:
General principles of law with respect to [peaceful uses of] outer space ... do
not restrain states from providing for their own self defense, or using force to
protect their space objects if they are attacked, and, more particularly they do
not deny them measures of military preparedness consistent with an advancing
military technology.8 1
In the case of encounters between the Soviet Union and United States, this
analysis is underscored with regard to surveillance satellites by the provision in
the ABM Treaty recognizing and protecting the role of "national verification"
means. Where an armed act of aggression occurs on a privately owned space
object, such as a space operation center owned by a consortium of private
firms, it may be inferred that the state of registry can consider the attack to be
upon itself since it retains "jurisdiction and control" of the vehicle under the
Outer Space Treaty."2
2. Violations of Established International Legal Standards
Of greater probability is the occurrence of some activity in the space segment short of an outright attack on another nation's property, but which is
perceived as a threat to peace. Possible examples would be the placement of
nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth or
the conduct of military maneuvers or weapons testing on the moon or other
celestial bodies, both in violation of the specific terms of the Outer Space
Treaty.
The first salient concern in this regard is that of verification of compliance
or, more aptly put, identification of violations. As discussed above, the Outer
Space Treaty has attempted to establish rudimentary legal procedures, some of
which speak to the practical concern of verification with dubious effectiveness.
Party states to the Treaty have an obligation to report to the Secretary-Gen80
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supra note 70, at 2.

1 Id.
62

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 40, art. VIII.
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eral of the U.N., as well as to the "public and international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable," on the nature, conduct,
location and results of all activities in space or on the moon or other celestial
bodies.8 3 The effectiveness of such an "honor system" for 8compliance
with the
4
terms of the Treaty has above been critically questioned.
The Outer Space Treaty also provides in article X for state parties, in
furthering the purposes of the Treaty, to "consider on a basis of equality" any
requests by other state parties to observe the "flight" of its space objects. This
provision was designed as a sort of most-favored-nation satellite tracking covenant.1 The obvious shortcomings of this provision is the fact that it does not
require cooperation, but only mandates that such cooperation be considered.
Article XII requires that all "installations, equipment and space vehicles located on the moon and other celestial bodies be open for inspection by other
party states on a basis of reciprocity."8 This on-site verification proviso represents a mandatory and, thus, more effective on-site verification approach than
reflected in the previously discussed paragraph. However, no on-site inspection
is required for orbiting space objects, and the concept of "reciprocity" may
work to qualify materially the provision's effectiveness. More effective verification could be secured by extending the approach of article XII to encompass
verification anywhere in the space domain. In that manner, a party state capable and willing to undertake verification would have meaningful opportunity to
publicize the results of its findings to the international community, thereby
identifying a breach of international legal responsibility as the first step toward
resolution of that conflict.
Assuming that Treaty violations can be identified, a separate problem of
effective response to such violation exists. Under the Treaty, no sanctions are
provided against parties for violations. Efforts by both the United States and
the Soviet Union to incorporate such provisions in the final text failed. 87 The
only existing provision bearing on dispute resolution is found in article IX,
discussed above, which authorizes a party state to request "consultation" with
any other party state whose actions are deemed to cause "potentially harmful
interference with exploration and use of outer space." The consultation provision does not look to the resolution of conflict arising from threats to a state's
security, but instead only to obstacles to the peaceful exploration and use of
space.
In order to establish a meaningful dispute settlement procedure for the
situation described, an understanding should be reached that the "consultation" process may be utilized for any properly identified violation of the Convention. In this connection, more effective use of the consultation process
might be achievable if an "appellate" procedure was established permitting an
83 Outer

Space Treaty, supra note 40, art. XI.
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
Dembling & Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR.& COMM. 419, 44244 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Dembling & Axons].
86 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 40, art. XII.
7 Dembling & Aons, supra note 85, at 453.
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unsatisfied complaining party, after consultation, to seek relief in the United
Nations or, perhaps, the International Court of Justice through a binding jurisdiction provision.
3. Assertion of Sovereignty
Another foreseeable form of conflict could erupt as a result of a state asserting a "zone of security" around a space habitat or space platform. With the
introduction of a manned presence in space, the liklihood of efforts to establish
such "zones" will increase. Depending on its extent, this space-age form of territorial claim could plausibly cause interference with the space objects of other
nations whose orbits might come close to that of the protected object. At the
least, adequate grounds would exist to raise suspicion as to the mission of the
vehicle surrounded by the protective zone. For example, during Space Shuttle
Mission 5, the Soviet Salyut space station passed, at one time, within 20 kilometers of the orbiter Columbia - close enough for direct visual contact.
The establishment of such a zone could be a proper subject of the consultation procedure in article IX of the Outer Space Treaty if a complaining state
were able to demonstrate that its exploration or use of space was interfered
with by the creation of the zone. Certainly, this argument would take on
greater credence if numerous states adopted the "zone" concept as the number
of space habitats and space platforms increased.
More probably, however, it could be argued that the zone violated the
Outer Space Treaty in at least two ways. First, it would constitute an illegal
assertion of sovereignty over a segment of space in violation of article II. Establishment of the zone, however, might be justified on the ground that it constitutes a pre-emptive form of "self defense." The second possible violation
would be of the party state's obligation under article X to "consider" requests
to "observe the flight" of its protected vehicle. Unless adequate observation
could be made from outside the zone, the state would have to consider allowing
penetration of the zone for flight observation purposes in order to comply with
the Treaty.
Assuming that either of these two arguments is to be made, the interpretive problem would initially be faced as to whether such alleged Treaty violations are the proper subjects for consultation. In order for a viable dispute
settlement procedure to emerge, such an interpretation or gloss should be
given to the consultation article.
CONCLUSION

Clearly, the epoch of permanent habitation of outer space is at hand.
Equally clear is that mankind's move into the high frontier will be accompanied by a host of legal issues, questions and dilemmas. The task of the international space law community is to provide a legal framework that allows space
industrialization to occur in a context of internationally agreed-upon rights
and obligations. The manned use of space for military purposes, on the other
hand, would appear to be a proper object for express legal restrictions at this
point in history.
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This Article has shown that a substantial start has been made in developing the legal regime which will govern permanent manned activity in space. In
the area of space manufacturing, including deployment of large space structures, existing space treaties provide an initial legal framework for the exercise
of national jurisdiction and control and for the resolution of liability questions
arising from activities in outer space. With regard to the utilization of space for
military purposes, existing space treaties provide only general guidance as to
permissible national defense missions.
As space manufacturing and national defense missions continue to generate requirements for a permanent manned presence in space, the existing legal
regime will soon give rise to more legal questions than it solves. Questions relating to enforcement of space liability claims, zones of jurisdiction and control
around space habitats and space-based directed energy weapons hover at the
frontier of international space law. And, in less time from now than has transpired since man first physically broached the space environment, fundamental
questions will arise regarding the legal rights of permanent space habitat residents to order their own affairs and to generate their own law.
Hence, the legal implications of a permanent manned presence in space
extend from the practical concerns of liability for damage to the philosophical
underpinnings governing man's choice of governance. In no area of human endeavor are the legal implications so diverse; in no arena of human accomplishment are the legal challenges so profound.
It must be recalled that "international law is a social process by which
values are created. .

.

.[A]nd which, through a balancing of interests,.

. .

fur-

ther[s] the goals of predictability and stability."88 The need for predictability
and stability is supreme in space, an environment in which man can survive
only by the grace of his technology. While international law can provide a predictable and stable framework for space activity, this can only be achieved
through tireless efforts to reach consensus on values. Certainly the interests to
be balanced are vital and not ones which can be easily compromised.
The scientific community is about to open the door to an epoch in which
humans permanently occupy the outer space environment. The benefits to humanity of this new epoch depend on the efforts of the international legal community. Failure to achieve consensus or unwise balancing of vital interests will
render space activity risky, unpredictable and generally unattractive except for
military applications. The promulgation of a practical international legal regime which recognizes and provides for the interests of all parties interested in
space development will ensure that a maximum level of enjoyment will flow
from man's conquest of space. While international space lawmakers clearly
shoulder an awesome responsibility, they also enjoy a powerful opportunity.
The opportunity, which has come but once in history, is to blueprint the rights
and obligations of countless generations of inhabitants in the limitless frontier
of space.
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